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Abstract In the late twentieth century, many social scientists and other social
commentators came to characterize the world as evolving into an “information
society.” Central to these claims was the notion that new social uses of information,
and particularly application of scientific knowledge, are transforming social life in
fundamental ways. Among the supposed transformations are the rise of intellectuals
in social importance, growing productivity and prosperity stemming from increasingly knowledge-based economic activity, and replacement of political conflict by
authoritative, knowledge-based decision-making. We trace these ideas to their
origins in the Enlightenment doctrines of Saint Simon and Comte, show that
empirical support for them has never been strong, and consider the durability of their
social appeal.
Intellectuals love to vie in the effort to name their own age – to define the
essential and salient qualities that distinguish the times in which they live from every
other. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, the upper hand in this struggle
often seemed to go those insisting that we were entering an “Information Society.”
Beginning in the 1960s the idea took hold among many social scientists that information
had assumed a new and decisive role in human affairs. For exponents of this idea, social
processes based on innovative information uses, and particularly the transformation of
information into authoritative knowledge, manifestly represented the distinguishing
feature of the age. Characterizing the world’s “advanced” societies as “information
societies” became as axiomatic as bracketing other eras as “Neolithic societies” or
“feudal societies.”
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All sorts of dazzling developments presented themselves to support that
designation. These included the rise of cyberspace; the role of science and technology in creating new products and services; the use of social and economic
indicators to guide government and private-sector policy; and the role of scientific
thinking in setting countless other directions in human affairs. Wherever one turned,
one encountered both dramatic new forms of information and ingenious new means
for exploiting it. It seemed all but self-evident that no social trend could be more
fundamental than these in marking the difference between the world that was
emerging, and the one being left behind.
The idea of a world being transformed from top to bottom by new forms and uses
of socially-relevant information continues to fuel a steady stream of commentary
directed at general audiences.1 But since the late 1990s, social scientists’ fixation on
these ideas has yielded ground to other images of our times – “risk society,” for
example, or “liquid modernity.” Skeptics have questioned the centrality of information or knowledge, as juxtaposed against other social states or processes.2 More
recent commentators on the social role of information provide more qualified or
nuanced accounts of that role.
But we believe that what we identify as the classic information society
(henceforth IS) model warrants a closer and more detailed critical look than it has
received. We suspect that the attractions of this view transcend historical periods –
that they are likely to reassert themselves in the future, if only because of the
complimentary self-image that they provide to intellectuals who embrace them.
In the pages to follow, we probe the intellectual career of these ideas, treating the
notion of a rising information society as an empirically-relevant model. This classic
IS idea, as we describe it, consists of a series of interrelated characterizations of
relations between knowledge and information, on the one hand, and key social
processes. These characterizations, though often vaguely stated in IS writings, are
empirically relevant. That is, they stand to gain or lose credibility through confrontation with properly selected data. We aim to pursue these possibilities here.
Specifically, we seek to assess the coherence and conceptual clarity of the underlying
model; to inquire what evidence might, even in principle, bear on the model’s
persuasiveness; and to consider the (limited) strands of evidence available to that
end.
In fact, the recent vogue of information society thinking consists of ideas that
are far from new. They date back to the founding of modern social science –
notably, to the Enlightenment thinking of Saint Simon and Comte. These and other
Enlightenment figures, like many late-twentieth-century social scientists, saw
themselves at the forefront of an entirely new social hierarchy – one based on
authoritative information or knowledge.
In a famous passage, Saint Simon speculated about the hypothetical losses to
France, should it be deprived of “thirty thousand individuals who are deemed most
important to the State” – i.e., its feudal elite – versus the loss of the “three thousand
1

E.g., Alvin Toffler, The third wave, New York 1980; Newt Gingrich, To renew America, New York
1995; Thomas L. Friedman, The world is flat; A brief history of the twenty-first century, New York, 2007.

2

E.g., Frank Webster, Theories of the information society, London 1995; Jorge Schement and Terry
Curtis, Tendencies and tensions of the information age, New Brunswick, NJ 1995.
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best scientists, artists, and artisans in France.”3 In the first case, he wrote, the country
would feel the loss only from “a sentimental point of view,” whereas the loss of its
productive members would leave the nation “a lifeless corpse.”4 Statements like
these obviously prefigure Marx’s notions that the “superstructures” of feudal society
were doomed through their irrelevance to the activities and relationships generating
the essential energy and prosperity of a new age.
Saint Simon’s model of large-scale social change turned on the role of knowledge
and information. What made the progressive elements of French society indispensable was their grasp of facts and principles basic to efficiency and prosperity. As the
role of rational understanding increasingly came to be recognized as essential for all
socially useful activity, he held, populations would be less and less willing to tolerate
authority based on superstition, tradition, or other arbitrary claims. Thus like Marx,
Saint Simon regarded the great revolution of 1789 as a manifestation of the poor fit
between the structures of feudal authority and the realities of everyday practice.
Unlike Marx, he saw change in prevailing forms of knowledge as the engine driving
these changes.
The enlightened, productive classes in Saint Simon’s model were thus defined by
their access to, and reliance upon, authoritative knowledge. To be sure, different
members of this group embodied this reliance in different measure – from pure
scientists and other theorists to the practical artisans or husbandmen whose work
was organized on rational principles. The crucial point was that the rationality of
their thought-ways produced new economic bounty, and concomitantly new and
distinctive social forms. Above all, the rise of rational thinking supported new
principles of social hierarchy, as authority increasingly came to be based on
authoritative knowledge. Thus politics evolved relentlessly into administration.
August Comte, Saint Simon’s disaffected disciple, put forward a similar vision.
For him, the rise of science was evolving into a new positivist religion that would
eclipse the authority of both church and state. In the words of Frank Manuel, the
authoritative chronicler of these Enlightenment ideas, Comte held that “[t]he state
was but a subject ready to take on the coloration of the positive religion once the
executive power was enlightened.”5
Many of these ideas of course now have a fantastical ring – especially when
identified as originating with the founders of positivism. But the idea of authoritative
scientific knowledge supplanting the sordid role of naked interest in human affairs
exerted great influence in late twentieth-century IS thinking, as did a number of
other key elements of Saint Simon’s and Comte’s thinking.
By the 1960s, thinkers in various social science disciplines began to see the IS
model as describing profound changes gathering speed in the world’s advanced
societies. Different thinkers focused greater or lesser attention on different elements
of the model. Indeed, what we identify as the classic IS model is multi-faceted
enough that one might logically accept one part of it while rejecting others. But the
elements appear to have elective affinities for one another; thinkers attracted to one

3

Keith Taylor, editor, Henri Saint Simon; Selected writings, London 1975, p. 194.

4

Ibid., pp. 194–195.
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Frank Manuel, The Prophets of Paris, Cambridge MA, 1962, pp. 270–271.
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seem likely to embrace others. We might summarize the over-all vision in the
following terms:
1. History proceeds through stages, each stage shaped by a distinctive social force
or principle. We have recently entered a new era distinguished by the changed
roles played by information and knowledge in social and economic life. Latterday information society writers do not commit themselves to precise dates for
the onset of this new era, but many seem to see it dating roughly from the
beginning of the last third of the twentieth century.
2. A basic feature of this new order is that larger proportions both of populations
and of their activities involve purposeful use of authoritative information or
knowledge. For this reason, information and knowledge matter more than before
in setting directions of human conduct.
3. In this new social order, information and the ability to use it appropriately
become the source of great value. Inputs of knowledge and information play a
crucial role in fostering productivity and economic growth. Accordingly,
decisive advantage accrues to those individuals and organizations that master
their use.
4. Perhaps the most consequential feature of the new order is change in all kinds of
authority and direction-setting in public affairs. In the information society,
exercise of power increasingly requires justification through authoritative
information. Arbitrary, uninformed decision-making based on special or partisan
interests is less and less tenable. Accordingly, structures and processes involving
authority, from those of the state to those in private-sector organizations, are
undergoing profound change.
The vision of social change implied in these four points, we believe, inevitably
has special appeal to intellectuals. It obviously ascribes to this group a special and
flattering role in realization of key values, as interpreters of the requirements of
reason in human affairs. This idea entered twentieth-century sociology, via Comte, in
Durkheim’s vision of sociologists as physicians of the body social. From there, it
helped inspire American functionalist thinking on expert “solutions” to “social
problems.” The self-congratulatory image of social science conveyed here is so
attractive that we doubt that it has made its last historical appearance.
We want to call special attention to the last of the four points; a distinctive
theoretical element of Saint Simon’s and Comte’s thinking that continued to
influence late twentieth-century scholars. The idea that deep social conflicts are
somehow based on inadequate understanding is a characteristic Enlightenment
notion. The broad alternative consists of views that posit irreconcilable conflicts of
interest as an enduring possibility in social life, regardless of the state of reliable
knowledge or scientific understanding. We need to assess what empirical light recent
social developments may have to shed on these conflicting visions.

IS thinking in the late twentieth century
Again, though logically independent, the four themes noted above often go together.
At least among late-twentieth-century IS thinkers, those who held that information
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was taking on sweeping new roles in social life tended also to believe that the overall effect is unifying and beneficent. Let us review some key markers in the
resurgence of IS thinking since the 1960s.
Triggering the revival was economist Fritz Machlup’s The Production and
Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (1962).6 Machlup’s inspiration was
to consider knowledge as a distinct sector of the economy, and to classify and survey
its extent. He systematically enumerated the dollar value of such activities as
education, research and development, communications and the like, along with the
machines and other capital that support these activities. One key finding was that
knowledge-related activities were taking on increasing importance in the US
economy. The “expenditures for knowledge-production were almost 29% of the
GNP” in 1958, he concludes; remuneration to “knowledge workers” rose much more
sharply, Machlup reports, in the two decades leading up to 1958 than did other
remuneration.7 These conclusions that growth in knowledge-related activities was
greatly outstripping other forms of growth in the economy made a vast impression
on subsequent debate.
Machlup offered no hypotheses on the social relationships characterizing what he
saw as an increasingly information-based economy. But such ideas became common
currency among liberal social scientists in the 1960s. Political scientist Robert Lane
provided one salient contribution in an article entitled “The Decline of Politics and
Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society.” He defined the knowledgeable society as one
whose members
(a) inquire into the basis of their beliefs…; (b) are guided… by objective
standards of veridical truth…; (c) devote considerable resources to this inquiry
and thus have a large store of knowledge; (d) collect, organize and interpret
their knowledge in a constant effort to extract further meaning from it for the
purposes at hand; (e) employ this knowledge to illuminate (and perhaps
modify) their values and goals as well as to advance them.8
Lane saw knowledgeable social relations on the rise, particularly in the public
sphere. There politics, in the sense of naked clashes of interest, were giving way to
rational public decision-making. Indices of such change were the rise of the civil
service, professional bodies like the General Accounting Office, the Council of
Economic Advisors, and growing reliance on special commissions and professional
research organizations like RAND. Though Lane did acknowledge that “there will
always be politics,” the broad trend that he describes corresponds to what Saint
Simon had in mind when he envisaged a social world evolving “from the
government of men to the administration of things.”9
Lane’s sweeping ideas did no more than articulate a swelling current of educated
opinion in the 1960s on relations between expert knowledge and governance. This
was, after all, the period in which a number of noted intellectuals discerned the
6

Fritz Machlup, The production and distribution of knowledge in the United States, Princeton 1962.
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Ibid., pp. 399, 396.
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Robert Lane, The decline of politics and ideology in a knowledgeable society. American Sociological
Review (31) 5, p. 650.
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extinction of ideology in favor of applications of expertise in the management of
public affairs.10 Those years saw a striking outpouring of optimism among social
scientists about the potential role of their disciplines in solving social problems and
directing the actions of power-holders.
One manifestation was the movement to create systems of “social indicators,”
statistics on the well-being of American society that would provide authoritative
policy implications to decision-makers.11 Another was the sweeping recommendations from Dr. Nicholas Golovin, of the President’s Office of Science and
Technology. In a truly Saint-Simonian inspiration, he proposed nothing less than a
fourth branch of government, composed of experts from both physical and social
sciences, to guide policy formation. The new agency would “a) collect all the data
necessary to continually track the state of the nation, b) define potential problems
suggested by the information, c) develop alternative plans to cope with the problems,
and d) evaluate ongoing projects in terms of real time and advise the people
accordingly.”12
But quite apart from their public appeals for expanded professional influence,
social scientists’ scholarly writings identified a new, information-based era arising in
the world’s advanced societies. Some of the earliest and strongest statements came
from Peter Drucker.13 Like Saint Simon, he heralded the beginning of a new phase
of social evolution, a phase marked by a new socio-economic role of information:
“Knowledge” rather than “science” has become the foundation of the modern
economy…. To be sure, science and scientists have suddenly moved into the
center of the political, military, and economic stage. But so have practically all
the other knowledge people. It is not just the chemists, the physicists, and the
engineers who get fat on consulting assignments… Geographers, geologists,
and mathematicians, economists and linguists, psychologists, anthropologists
and marketing men are all busy consulting with governments, with industry,
with the foreign aid program, and so on. Few areas of learning are not in
demand….
This demand, in turn, reflects the basic fact that knowledge has become
productive. The systematic and purposeful acquisition of information and its
systematic application… are emerging as the new foundation for work,
productivity, and effort throughout the world.14
In a later statement, Drucker draws a conclusion that is sweeping, but by no
means uncharacteristic of subsequent information society thinkers:
That knowledge has become the resource, rather than a resource, is what makes
our society ‘post-capitalist.’ This fact changes – fundamentally – the structure

10

Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, Editorial: What is the Public Interest?, The Public Interest (1) 1, 1965
pp. 3–4.

11

US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Toward a social report, Washington, D.C. 1969.

12

John Lear, Public policy and the study of man, Saturday Review, 7 September 1968, p. 60.

13

E.g., Peter Drucker, The age of discontinuity, New York 1968.
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of society. It creates new social and economic dynamics. It creates new
politics….
The knowledge we now consider knowledge proves itself in action. What we
now mean by knowledge is information effective in action, information focused
on results. These results are seen outside the person – in society and economy,
or in the advancement of knowledge itself.15
Here we have nearly all the key elements of the IS model.
These ideas received perhaps their most noted expression in Daniel Bell’s The
Coming of Post-Industrial Society; a Venture in Social Forecasting. Like Machlup,
Drucker and many other observers, Bell held that crucial information processes were
becoming both more widespread and more influential in the world’s “advanced”
societies. He wrote in the opening pages of that work,
Post-Industrial society is organized around knowledge, for the purpose of social
control and the directing of innovation and change; and this in turn gives rise to
new social relationships and new structures….16
This new role of knowledge, Bell held, involved not just quantitative growth but a
qualitatively new stage of social development – “a new principle of social–technical
organization and ways of life, just as the industrial system… replaced an agrarian
way of life.”17
For Bell, as for Lane, new sources of authoritative information created new
political directions – by making it possible to chart rational designs for collective
action in ways that bypassed the ideological snares of politics. And as for Drucker
(and Saint Simon), the emergence of a world that turned on information required
increasing scientific and technological sophistication:
… one can say that the methodological promise of the second half of the
twentieth century is the management of organized complexity (the complexity
of large organizations and systems, the complexity of theory with a large
number of variables), the identification and implementation of theories of
rational choice in games against nature and games against persons, and the
development of new intellectual technology which, by the end of the century,
may be as salient in human affairs as machine technology has been for the past
century and a half.18
Note the top-down character of the action seen to arise from the new forms of
knowledge; Bell’s view is obviously no more populist than Saint Simon’s.
Like all information society thinkers, Bell viewed information-related activities as
a decisive new source of value in economic life. And access to information, and the
ability to work with it, confer power and authority.

15

Peter Drucker, Post capitalist society, New York 1993, pp. 45–46.

16

Daniel Bell, The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting, New York 1973,
p. 20.
17

Daniel Bell, The third technological revolution. Dissent, Spring 1989.

18

Daniel Bell, The coming of post-industrial society, p. 28.
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Information becomes a central resource, and within organizations a source of
power. Professionalism thus becomes a criterion of position….
If the struggle between capitalist and worker, in the locus of the factory, was the
hallmark of the industrial society, the clash between the professional and the
populace… is the hallmark of conflict in the post-industrial society.19
Thus, like Saint Simon and many contemporary writers, Bell saw experts as a
new and indispensable class. Their new role in directing human action on the basis
of authoritative information would define the distinctive social dynamics of the
new era.
By the 1980s, ideas like these had become so widely accepted as to be repeated
with less and less qualification. The utopian elements grew even more marked, as
commentators convinced themselves that the most seemingly intractable social
dilemmas would be resolved through availability of authoritative information. In the
words of Harlan Cleveland, political scientist, management expert, university
president, and Ambassador:
We can take it as read that information is the dominant resource in the United
States, and coming to be so in other advanced or developing countries.20
And he continued,
The inherent characteristic of physical resources (both natural and man-made)
made possible the development of hierarchies of power based on control (of
new weapons, of energy sources, of trade routes, or markets, and especially of
knowledge), hierarchies of influence based on secrecy, hierarchies of class
based on ownership, hierarchies of privilege based on early access to valuable
resources, and hierarchies of politics based on geography.
Each of these five bases for discrimination and unfairness is crumbling today –
because the old means of control are of dwindling efficacy; secrets are harder
and harder to keep; and ownership, early arrival, and geography are of
dwindling significance in getting access to the knowledge and wisdom which
are the really valuable legal tender of our time.21
Here we see the resilient optimism of information society thinking in its fullblown form. Increasingly available, authoritative information becomes, in this
view, the all-purpose leveller of irrational social advantage. As for Saint Simon,
authoritative, scientific understanding undermines the bases for arbitrary privilege
and unproductive social conflict.
Following Bell, perhaps the most noted strictly sociological development of the
information society idea comes from Manuel Castells (1996). His monumental,
three-volume study of global social change, The Information Age, lives up to its title
by casting information processes as central to distinctive, newly-emerging social
19

Ibid., pp. 128–129.
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Harlan Cleveland, The twilight of hierarchy; speculations on the global information society. In Bruce R.
Guile, editor, Information technologies and social transformation, Washington, DC 1985, p. 56.
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structures. Like Bell, Cleveland, Drucker, Machlup and many others, Castells takes
it for granted that control of information, and of the technologies that manipulate it,
grants commanding status in all sorts of settings. In the Prologue, he writes
In the new, informational mode of development the source of productivity lies
in the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol
communication. To be sure, knowledge and information are critical elements in
all modes of development, since the process of production is always based on
some level of knowledge and in the processing of information. However, what
is specific to the informational mode of development is the action of knowledge
upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity… Information processing is focused on improving the technology of information processing as a
source of productivity, in a virtuous circle of interaction between the knowledge
sources of technology and the application of technology to improve knowledge
generation and information processing.22
And for Castells, too, success in the emerging global order depends on strategic
use of newly-available information resources:
the successful organizations are those able to generate knowledge and process
information efficiently; to adapt to the variable geometry of the global
economy; to be flexible enough to change its means as rapidly as goals change...
The network enterprise makes material the culture of the informational/global
economy: it transforms signals into commodities by processing knowledge.23
(1996, pp. 171–172, emphasis in original)
Again, a familiar theme: successful organizations, those most adapted to the
world of the future, will be those that take full advantage of the possibilities of
information for rational decision making.
One could extend this review of scholarly visions of the information society at
great length.24 These and other authors differ in the detail of their ideas on the role of
information in late-twentieth-century social change. But all embrace key elements of
the four-point model spelled out above, and view that model as increasingly
approximated by empirical realities in advanced societies of the late-twentieth
century.
It would be absurd to imagine that any model as rich as this one could admit of
a binary, up-or-down “test.” But it does abound with empirical implications, all of
them at least in principle accessible to confrontation with potentially contrary
evidence. Examination of such evidence, we hold, not only raises questions about
the empirical strength of the doctrine, but also about some key theoretical elements
going back to Saint Simon himself.

22
Manuel Castells, The rise of the network society; economy, society and culture, Volume I of The
information age: economy, society and culture, Malden, MA 1996, p. 17.
23
24

Ibid., pp. 171–72, emphasis in original.

E.g., Alain Touraine, The post-industrial society, New York 1971; Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The
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The rise of “information activities”
One salient idea is the notion that the rising, information-oriented social order
involves increasing economic activity based on knowledge or information. These
ideas have been pursued in greatest detail by Marc Porat in a much-noted report
commissioned by the US Commerce Department.25
Inspired directly by Fritz Machlup, Porat set out to quantify, in exhaustive detail,
the changing role of information in the US economy, particularly regarding work and
occupations. In addition to crediting Machlup, Porat acknowledges the influence of
works by Bell and Drucker. Central to Porat’s analysis is the distinction between
informational and non-informational work. “An economy can be separated into two
domains,” he writes:
The first is involved in the transformation of matter and energy from one form
to another. The second is involved in transforming information fron [sic] one
pattern into another.26
Porat acknowledges that all human activity involves some uses of information.
But he willingly identifies various activities and occupations as predominantly
informational or non-informational. Thus the information sector of a firm can be
understood as
all the workers, machinery, goods, and services that are employed in processing, manipulating or transmitting information. The telephone, the computer,
the printing press, the calculator, the manager the secretary and the programmer –
these are all essential members of the information activity.27
Similarly, Porat identifies information capital including “typewriters, calculators,
copiers, terminals, computers, telephone and switchboards” and information workers
“research scientist, engineer, designer, draftsman, manager, secretary, clerk, accountant, lawyer, advertising manager, communications officer, personnel director – all
essentially paid to create knowledge, communicate ideas, process information – in one
way or another transform symbols from one form to another.”
Porat classifies all 422 occupations reported by the US Census in terms of
whether “the worker’s income originates primarily in the manipulation of symbols
and information.” The economy as a whole is further classified into a “primary
information sector” consisting of “those firms which supply the bundle of information goods and services exchanged in a market context” (p. 3) and “secondary
information sector” including “all the information services produced for internal
consumption by government and non-information firms” (p. 3).28 Summing the
activities of these two sectors yields statistics intended to describe the total role of
information in the economy. After exhaustive efforts of classification, Porat

25

Marc Porat, The information economy; definitions and measurement, Washington, DC 1977.
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concludes that “the informational activity” accounted for some 46% of the US GNP
in 1967 – a figure much cited since then.29
A major concern of Porat’s is historical change. He detects a broad shift from the
nineteenth century, when the first statistics are available to him, to the time of his
writing; Porat comments,
In Stage I (1860–1906), the largest single group in the labor force was
agriculture. By the turn of the century, industrial occupations began to grow
rapidly and became predominant during stage II (1906–1954). In the current
period, Stage III, information occupations comprise the largest group.30
Findings like these obviously resonate with key evolutionary ideas of IS thinking.
For many readers, they have no doubt confirmed the perception that the United
States and undoubtedly other advanced societies have indeed entered an “information age.”
But there are questions of interpretation. Surely some of the employment decline
in both agriculture and manufacturing results simply from social differentiation –
i.e., rising division of labor – in these domains. Insofar as farmers and manufacturers
come to rely on accountants, agronomists, engineers, or other specialists in symbolic
activity, the proportion of “information work” registered among all occupations is
bound to grow. But such growth would not in itself indicate that more “informational
work” is being done – only that certain informational aspects of what had been
bracketed as essentially non-informational work have now been re-organized as
stand-alone activities. The cumulative effect of reclassifications like this would be to
exaggerate the rise of informational activities throughout the economy.
At one point, Porat seems to bump up against this possibility, without altogether
acknowledging its implications. This occurs in his discussion of what might appear
as an unaccountable rise in information occupations in the period 1860–1885,
followed by an equally abrupt decline from about 1885 to just before the turn of the
twentieth century. What can explain this rise, at a period when we have little to
suggest a special rise in information use in American life? Porat’s interpretation is as
follows:
In part, the growth is a definitional artifact: as family farms and businesses
dissolved in the face of industrialization and urbanization, jobs assumed a
formality that was measured by the Census. The son and daughter vanished,
and an employee took their place.31
Although Porat does not give evidence for this interpretation, his account is
consistent with what one would expect as the result of differentiation. But it raises
deeper questions about the significance of the broad shift toward informational
activities and occupations shown in Porat’s work. If the otherwise unexplained
growth of “informational occupations” might result from changing classifications of
activities that in fact did not change in their net informational content, to what extent

29
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might the same be said for the rise of the information economy more generally? How
many new information occupations represent qualitatively new activities, and how
many are simply activities of long standing, reorganized as distinct specialties?
But Porat’s figures do attest to the role of one unquestionably authentic social
and economic trend – the shift from human to machine power. This much-noted
transition had implications in all sorts of directions, ranging from rising consumption
of fossil fuels to falling caloric intakes among the populations of industrial societies.
Since agriculture and manufacturing are defined as non-informational, the numbers
of people involved in them are bound to decline as machines take over the work of
digging, lifting, assembling, and the like. The workers freed from such physical
work on the farm and in the factory then become available for work involving
manipulation of symbols, rather than things.
Other questions of interpretation arise in connection with the binary distinction
between “informational” and “non-informational” activities. Does this distinction
really get at the sorts of issues raised, say, by Saint Simon when he sought to identify
the occupations most reliant on rational or scientific reasoning? Porat, we believe,
aims at a much simpler judgment. He compares the work of a carpenter with that of
a computer programmer, describing both as skilled occupations:
However, the programmer’s livelihood originates with the provision of an
information service (a set of instructions to the computer), while the carpenter’s
livelihood originates with the construction of a building or a piece of furniture –
non-informational goods.32
This distinction misses two important things. First, the role of information
processes in work involving the manipulation of things (i.e., “non-informational
goods”); and second, the analytical content of information processes involved in any
sort of work. All IS authors (Porat included) ultimately acknowledge that
information is an essential element of all social action. Regarding work roles, for
example, it is impossible to imagine any form of work that does not require the
worker in some way to assess the task at hand. But it seems absurd to ignore that
different forms of work embody different forms of information processing, including
different degrees of analysis and abstraction.
Compare the work of a data-entry specialist with that of a surgeon. The former’s
work – let us say, transferring sheets of hand-written sales orders into the computer
record – is entirely informational. In contrast, by Porat’s criterion, the surgeon
engages in a non-informational activity, in that the ultimate result is change of a
physical kind. Yet we ordinarily think of surgery as involving scientific thinking, or
at least application of analytical abstractions to information on complex situations.
Data-entry, on the other hand, is totally informational, but normally not especially
analytic.
Then there are ambiguities in the application of the informational versus noninformational distinction. Someone who digs a hole in the ground presumably is
engaged in non-informational work – despite the fact that he or she clearly must
exercise at least some judgment about where to dig, and how. But how do we
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classify the operator of a machine that digs the same sort of hole? The equipment
operator makes the same sorts of judgments as the manual worker, but implements
them through the control panel of the machine rather than muscle-power. So, for that
matter, do airline pilots, operating engineers at nuclear power plants and the
anesthetist who monitors the patient undergoing surgery. Should we regard all these
forms of work as strictly and equally “informational”?
For Saint Simon, again, the crucial question was how and how much a particular
activity contributed to efficiency in the pursuit of commonly-held social ends –
prosperity, good government, or reduction of grave social conflict, for example. But
it is hard to ascribe such results ipso facto to many occupations that Porat would
bracket as “informational.” True, that category includes a number of professions that
Saint Simon would have recognized as part of his progressive class – engineers,
urban planners, accountants, lawyers – all engaged in activities that arguably involve
application of rational principles to human endeavors. But no less “informational,”
in Porat's terms, are such occupations as advertising copy writers, creators of soap
operas, fortune tellers, and video-game designers. Porat is characteristically direct
about this issue:
I am completely indifferent as to the motivation for acquiring knowledge, or
even to the quality of the knowledge relative to other kinds of knowledge. It
does not have to be ‘good’ information to qualify as an information service, nor
does it have to be ‘true’. Unfortunately, lies, distortions, and inaccuracies are
still information.33
As a practical matter, one can see why Porat chose to avoid judging quality in
information activities. The conceptual ambiguity of making such judgments for
every distinct occupation would surely make it impossible to arrive at the summary
figures that he presents. But the binary informational versus non-informational
distinction leads us in a very different direction from the one that inspired Saint
Simon.
What can we learn from Porat’s exposition concerning the essentials of information society thinking?
First, it seems clear that, as work roles requiring major physical exertion in farms
and factories have grown fewer, a growing proportion of all occupations have
become “informational” in Porat’s sense. Fewer and fewer jobs involve application
of human muscle power to planting, lifting, moving, digging, and the like – and
more involve recording or transmitting information, guiding machines in light of
information, co-ordinating action with others, and similar symbolic activities.
Similarly, like many other domains of social life, information processes have
clearly grown both more differentiated and more formal over the last century or so.
This means, for one thing, that information itself is more likely to be recorded
outside the human mind – in written codes and rules, computer records, symbolic
algorithms, and texts of many other sorts. And it means that activities involving
information increasingly have become the province of specialized roles. The affinity
between these newly-differentiated roles and formally-recorded information is
obvious. But it would be a mistake to imagine that the activities involved – from
33
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weather forecasting to psychotherapy – have no analogs in less formally distinct
informational activities.
It is beyond dispute, in other words, that information use is taking new forms. But
it is far from clear that these changes necessarily involve net growth in the
informational content of social processes (however one might measure this diffuse
concept), or that the role played by information has necessarily become, on balance,
more consequential.

In search of the information society
These quandaries compel reflection on what evidence might conceivably serve to
support the distinctive tenets of IS thinking. Clearly it will not do to assume that all
activities that are symbolic – i.e., all uses of information – must necessarily conduce
to what Saint Simon would consider enlightened social action, or what Lane would
bracket as “knowledgeable” social relations. Informational activities distinctive of
our times, after all, include everything from research aimed at elimination of
international conflict to promulgation of computerized horoscopes; from efforts to
chart and control destructive climate change to production of ever-more sophisticated video games. Of the enormous investments devoted to information, vast
proportions obviously go to support activities that not only are not “knowledgeable,”
as Lane would have it, but that appear to foster anything but rational or analytical
thinking. These latter roles of information – from advertising to pornography to
pure entertainment – aim to confuse, benumb, or simply distract human thought
processes. It is very difficult to imagine how anyone might measure the proportion
of these latter processes among all “information activities.”
The problem is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, it is all but impossible
to imagine how activities like those detailed by Porat could reliably be classified in
terms of the extent to which they support any form of rational decision-making. The
practical difficulties involved in any such operation would simply be overwhelming.
Conceptually, the issues are even more troublesome. For any assessment of the
social role of information requires reckoning with a most basic theoretical topic – the
ultimate ends of human action.
By this, we mean questions of whether conflict and inefficiency in human affairs
in general are better understood as unsuccessful collective strivings toward goals
that are essentially shared – or whether contention over ultimate ends or interests
ought simply to be considered a fundamental fact of the human condition. Even
human activities involving highly efficient instrumental uses of information, after
all, may clearly serve ultimate ends that hardly anyone could consider substantively
rational – e.g., precise calculation of the most efficient ways of administering
concentration camps or propaganda campaigns. Authors like Saint Simon and Lane
embrace the assumption that increased availability of authoritative knowledge will
drastically reduce the long-term bases for social conflict and otherwise serve the
common good. But other assumptions, of equally long theoretical pedigree, lead to
quite different empirical implications.
IS thinkers have not had enough to say on these issues. One reason, we suspect,
is that empirical evidence that might form bases for judging the strength of the
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IS position is either thin or ambiguous. Another is that Saint Simon’s guiding
assumption that more knowledge must somehow lead to reduction in waste and
social conflict simply does not withstand critical reflection.
In the following pages, we aim to do a bit better than IS authors have, by
identifying and examining the limited empirical evidence available. We seek to
pursue what we consider the salient empirically-relevant arguments for their view, by
examining the social role of information in five settings. These are: the role of
information in fostering economic growth and productivity; the role of “theoretical
knowledge” (à la Daniel Bell and others) in personal advancement; the personal and
social benefits of formal education; the influence of information on hierarchy in
formal organizations; and the role of knowledge in governance. These five contexts,
we acknowledge, are highly disparate, both conceptually and in the sorts of
empirical evidence that might be drawn from them. But they represent the points at
which IS doctrine comes closest to making itself accessible to empirical refutation of
any kind.
We hold that a hard look at the largely scanty and ambiguous empirical evidence
on these matters does not provide clear support for the IS view. But let us be exact
about our argument. We do not dispute that changing information processes hold
important consequences for emerging patterns of social change, or that new forms
and roles of information warrant serious sociological attention. Nor, we stress, do we
mean to suggest than any empirical evidence refutes the essentials of IS thinking. IS
thinking is for one thing far too diffuse for any such possibility. Our point is rather
that the empirical implications of the doctrine are vague and elusive and that the
disparate and fragmentary evidence that is available provides no decisive support
for it. In particular, we see no clear evidence for the pre-eminence of changes in
“information activities” among myriad other social trends and forces shaping the
future. Where evidence seems to show rising importance of information, the very
interpretation of such evidence is often confounded by the unsettled theoretical
issues we have noted.
The role of information in fostering economic growth and productivity
Beginning with Saint Simon, IS thinkers have held it a basic feature of the new era
that information and knowledge are taking on increasing economic value. One need
only recall the statements quoted above from Cleveland or Drucker to the effect that
information is coming to replace the role of capital.
As in other contexts, one can point to many contemporary trends that would seem
to support the case. Everyone notices the value attached, for example, to patents,
genetic information, data derived from satellite observations, personal data (for
example, in guiding decision-making in credit and marketing), or successful
business strategies. One thinks of the fortunes made from software design, energy
exploration, or the exchange of insider information in world affairs, finance or
commodities markets. In all such cases, information is clearly a source of value.
But are information processes really growing more important in relation to the
economy as a whole? Is there any evidence of an “information revolution” in the
second half of the twentieth century involving a heightened importance of
information among other inputs to the production of wealth?
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Any attempt to answer a question like this runs up against the vagueness of IS
thinking as to what sorts of “information activities” might reasonably be considered
crucial economic inputs. In our own investigations, we have analyzed figures on patent
issuance, educational expenditures, and research and development expenditures in the
United States since 1955.34 All three of these factors represent ways in which
informational resources might plausibly take on economic value. Accordingly, we
looked for evidence that these factors contributed to American economic productivity
and growth in the period between 1954 and 2001.
In fact, these analyses show that the three information factors do not predict
productivity in this period. At least as indexed by these factors, informational inputs
show no effect on productivity change in American during this period.
We also examined the role of these inputs in predicting economic growth. Here
we found strong inputs from research and development expenditures and education;
patent issuance had no predictive value. This result is broadly supportive of the IS
idea that information activities foster prosperity. Why such a relationship should be
absent in the case of productivity is mystifying in this context, since IS thinking has
consistently envisaged that growth of information and knowledge make human
labors more productive.
We looked particularly for evidence of a transition to an information society or
economy at some point in the second half of the twentieth century. No IS author we
know of has specified when, exactly, such a transition is supposed to have occurred.
But implicit in many writings seems to be the notion that some such shift was under
way by the end of the 1960s – perhaps corresponding to the time when computing
came into widespread use in organizations.35
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We might have arbitrarily marked the cutoff point between the two periods at
1968, but statistical limitations led us to break our analyses into the periods 1955–
1970 and 1971–2000. These analyses, however, show no dramatic differences in the
strength of information variables in predicting economic growth during these
periods. Both research and development and educational expenditure are statistically
significant predictors during the first period, whereas only research and development
is a predictor during the second. Change in patent issuance is not a predictor in either
period.
To summarize: our analyses show positive effects of our informational inputs on
economic growth between 1954 and 2001, but little effect of productivity change
during this period. What the analysis does not show is evidence of the rise of a
distinctively new role of information in economic growth beginning around 1970.
“Theoretical knowledge” as the basis for personal success
Another empirically-relevant theme widely sounded by IS thinkers is the rising
importance of theoretical knowledge for personal productivity and success. In the
growing, information-oriented world, it is said, disproportionate reward will
inevitably go to those whose performances are based on formal, science-based
knowledge.
Daniel Bell often strikes this note in his writings on post-industrial society.36
For him, social advantage in an information-oriented world is bound to accrue to
university-educated scientists and other specialists who apply the latest scientific
insights to the management problems of complex, far-flung social and economic
structures. Thus, he asserts, we should no longer expect major inventions from
figures like A. G. Bell or T. A. Edison, talented innovators lacking in formal
education.37
Note that the specification of theoretical knowledge serves to resolve some of the
nagging questions left by analyses like Porat’s. Bell cannot be accused of lumping
unreflective, non-analytical uses of information with those that he sees as essential to
the distinctive qualities of post-industrial society. The forms of knowledge that
matter, he holds, are those propounded in scientific terms and disseminated through
formal institutions of higher learning.
But this line of argument raises questions in its own right. Is “theoretical”
knowledge really a distinct category? How does the analyst recognize it, in contrast
to other forms of knowledge – let alone measure the frequency of its use? There
would seem to be many ambiguous cases. Presumably the knowledge underlying
genetic mapping to develop new treatments for disease would qualify as strictly
“theoretical” in Bell’s sense; here the derivation of practical action from “pure”
scientific inquiry appears clear. But one can also point to developments like the
creation of the Microsoft empire. Its founder, Bill Gates, cut short his formal
education at Harvard to plunge directly into what proved to be a world-shaping,
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knowledge-intensive business.38 This latter success story sounds much like an echo
of the biographies of A. G. Bell or T. A. Edison, Daniel Bell notwithstanding.
Another case in point is George Soros, the fabulously successful investor who
began as a student of philosophy under Karl Popper and seems always to have
thought of himself as an intellectual. Those close to Soros gave mixed reports on the
role of formal, scientific reasoning in his financial decision-making. His biographer
quotes the words of his son:
[George Soros] will sit down and give you theories to explain why he does this
or that. But… the reason he changes his position on the market or whatever is
because his back starts killing him….
If you’re around him a long time, you realize that to a large extent he is driven
by temperament. But he is always trying to rationalize what are basically his
emotions.39
The biographer cites similar accounts from various other close associates of
Soros. The picture that emerges is one of brilliant analysis, certainly informed by
resourceful use of information – but not exactly of “theoretical” reasoning.
Similar ambiguities arise in attempts to classify many important genres of
information use. How do we understand the work of university-based jurists seeking
to protect consumer interests by developing new legal concepts and strategies
regarding product liability? What about makers of foreign policy seeking to exploit
the reports of diplomats and intelligence operatives to fine-tune diplomacy? What
about the experience-based understanding of a participant in a complex software
design project, whose knowledge base consists of detailed acquaintance with the
quirks and peculiarities of the various work groups and work styles constituting the
over-all operation? These uses of information may be analytical and intense; they
may have profound repercussions on human well-being. But are they “theoretical”?
Conceptual issues underlying these subtle and far-reaching questions are much
illuminated in the outstanding study of nuclear weapons engineering by Donald
McKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “The Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons.”40 The
authors inquire whether, with the passing of a generation of specialists who had
hands-on acquaintance with nuclear weapons manufacture, knowledge of how to
construct such weapons might simply be lost. They argue that, despite the bases of
nuclear weaponry in pure science, the actual making of weapons that work involves
much “tacit” knowledge – practical savoir faire that cannot be, or at least in practice
is not, transmitted through written formulae. Thus McKenzie and Sapinardi hold that
nuclear weapons could plausibly become “uninvented,” even as the underlying
corpus of formal, scientific understanding remained intact and available.
Our point is not to draw a bright line between “theoretical,” science-based
knowledge and other consequential uses of information, but to question the wisdom
of entertaining such a line. Analytical thinking comes in many different forms, and
38
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matters in countless ways for human affairs. It is hard to specify any empirical
evidence that could demonstrate that knowledge directly based on science, or even
on academic learning, matters more as a prerequisite for crucial human performances
than other forms of information use.
The rising importance of formal education
If social life is somehow becoming more “knowledgeable” over-all, one might
expect to see support for this trend in growing investments in education. Porat, for
example, charts the rates of growth in education, which he classifies as an
“information activity.” He reports a yearly growth rate of US expenditures in
primary and secondary education of 12.0% for the period 1948–1958; for higher
education in this same period, he reports a yearly rate of 7.5%.41 These findings are
of course consistent with his over-all portrayal of growth in knowledge activities
throughout the economy.
We have already reported our findings that educational expenditure is less
predictive of economic growth in the last three decades of the twentieth century than
in the preceding period – and that it does not seem to predict change in productivity
at any stage of the period since 1954. But IS thinkers might well point to other
evidence appearing to demonstrate rising importance of formal education. Some
would certainly point to rising wages of well-educated workers in the United States
over recent decades, in relation to the stagnant or falling compensation to the poorly
educated. For Robert Reich, for example, this gap demonstrates growing importance
of “symbolic analysis” in an increasingly information-oriented economy.42 Other
commentators would draw similar conclusions from the fact that many American
professions and occupations have established increasingly demanding entry standards, in terms of years of schooling and degrees taken. These trends presumably
attest to the increasing need for formal education as a basis for economic
effectiveness.
But the persuasiveness of such arguments depends on acceptance of functionalist
theoretical assumptions akin to those discussed above. The arguments posit that
growth in requirements for formal education in fact represents a response to “needs”
of the economy or society as a whole. This is a much-contested idea. At issue is
whether reliance on formal education is the cause of social advantage of educated
people, or its effect. In his classic The Credential Society, Randall Collins argues the
second point: that erection of formal credential requirements for all sorts of
occupations and professions results from pressure by established status groups to
restrict entry to privileged roles.43 He cites a variety of studies showing that, within
job categories, those with large amounts of formal training do not show better
performance than those with little such training. Much of the skill necessary for most
work roles is acquired on the job, Collins argues.44
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Erving Goffman made much the same point decades ago, when he wrote
the American Army during World War II innocently treated trades such as
pharmacy and watch-repairing in a purely instrumental way and trained
efficient practitioners in five or six weeks to the horror of established members
of these callings45
Goffman noted that pharmacists feel that the requirement of a 4-year university
degree to be certified as a pharmacist is “‘good for the profession’”; but “… some
admit that a few months’ training is all that is really needed.”46
Anyone attentive to requirement-setting within colleges and universities will note
many formal qualifications for degrees that seem equally tenuous in relation to
ultimate role performance – calculus for architects and chiropractors, for example, or
foreign-language exams for PhDs. As a number of writers have argued, formal
educational credentials may simply serve as a “screening device” or proxy for other
qualities of interest to employers – congenial manners, steady work habits, or the
status attributed to formal education.47
Much the same issue arises in interpretation of the growing role of information
technologies in the workplace, a trend that some have understood as manifesting the
generally greater productivity of “information intensive” activities. In a recent study
of the correlates of workers’ use of various tools on the job in America and
Germany, DiNardo and Pischke demonstrate that computer use is strongly associated
with higher wages. But the authors also show that similar wage advantages attach to
“on-the-job use of calculators, telephone, pens or pencils, or for those who work
sitting down.”48 One would hardly claim that the addition of pens or pencils raised
the productivity of workers in these instances. For similar reasons, we must be
careful about drawing conclusions about the” effects” of the apparent information
content of work roles on productivity.
Here as elsewhere, IS thinking raises theoretical questions that its proponents do
not directly confront. We can hardly afford to reject the possibility that knowledge
and information uniquely conveyed through formal education are indispensable for
personal success in today’s “information society” – that the crucial performances
presumably supplied by those with formal education could never take place without
it. But we should acknowledge that evidence has not yet been provided to sustain
such a conclusion.
Hierarchy in organizations
Saint Simon held that superior information and knowledge would erode all sorts of
irrational social hierarchies. Several of the more recent authors cited above explicitly
embrace this position. Actors endowed with authoritative information, the argument
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goes, take their directions from informed understanding, rather than blind authority,
superstition, or arbitrary custom. As society becomes more “knowledgeable,” all
forms of authority not based on reason tend to give way to information-based
relations.
A number of late-twentieth-century IS thinkers have applied this reasoning to
formal organizations, especially businesses. In their quest for efficient performance,
they hold, public and private organizations are adopting more collegial structures,
flattening once-sharp organizational profiles. In Drucker’s words,
Because the ‘players’ in an information-based organization are specialists, they
cannot be told how to do their work. There are probably few orchestra
conductors who could coax even one note out of a French horn, let alone
show the horn player how to do it. But the conductor can focus the horn
player’s skill and knowledge on the musicians’ joint performance. And this
focus is what the leaders of an information-based business must be able to
achieve (1988, p. 49).49
This vision of organizational change certainly bears empirical implications. One
can imagine investigating organizations to see whether those whose members have
more informational resources at their disposal are indeed less hierarchical. Drucker,
for example, makes it clear that he expects computerization to decrease the levels of
management separating chief executives from ordinary workers. The management
structures of highly-computerized organizations, in other words, should grow less
hierarchical, flatter. But he offers no systematic evidence on this point.
Neither have most other researchers, unfortunately, despite the fact that
computerization has been pervasive in organizations over the last two decades. We
have been able to identify just two published studies of computerization and
hierarchy in organizations: one from Australia in the 1980s, the other from the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s.50 Despite the authors’ efforts to do so, neither
of these studies finds evidence that computerization is associated with “flattening” of
management hierarchy.
At least one other empirical study would seem to point in the opposite direction.
David Gordon’s Fat and Mean argues that the dominant trend in American
businesses in the 1980s and early 1990s was increasing hierarchy.51 Gordon does
not specifically address changes in access to computing or other sources of
information, but his arguments refer to trends that occurred over the supposed course
of the “information revolution.” Gordon found that the proportion of staff in
American businesses involved in supervision of other workers grew for decades,
beginning about 1950. Perhaps more telling, American businesses by 1989 were
more top-heavy in supervisory ranks than their counterparts in virtually every other
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capitalist economy except Canada, and have remained so, even in the face of muchheralded corporate “downsizing.”52 Gordon portrays this salient difference as
resulting from management efforts to squeeze more work from lower-paid staff –
an interpretation not directly supported empirically. But whatever the explanation,
the statistical picture that he presents does not seem compatible with a view of
flattening authority structures over the course of the “information revolution.”
Another widely-noted change in one category of organizations in the world’s
“information societies” also poses problems for IS thinking. This is the growth of
vast, standardized retail enterprises purveying highly predictable products and
services through thousands of local establishments – MacDonald’s, the Gap,
Starbucks, etc. These organizations essentially succeed by replicating a successful
organizational formula on the largest possible scale.
Such replication clearly requires systematic organizational discipline over staff
performance at each site. Information technologies are often essential to such
enforced standardization of performance, as computers help monitor staff and
enforce norms set down by upper levels of management. Note one extreme case
reported in the study by Rule, Gimlin, and Sievers cited above; the authors quote a
site interviewer’s description of work at a fast-food franchise:
The cashier pushes buttons on the register corresponding to the items and
quantities ordered and NOT to the prices. The register has the prices in
memory, calculates tax, provides the total and calculates the change…. [Staff]
don't have to remember any prices…. On mechanical registers, they could enter
the wrong price, here if they hit a button for the item, they have to charge the
correct price.
A system like this makes it much more difficult for staff to take any action not
envisaged by those who designed the system; the authors comment:
the only way [for staff] to cheat… is to give away the food without entering it
on the register at all... [I]f this were done to any extent… the computerized
inventory control system would soon call attention to the missing ingredients.53
Other accounts from this study show how computerized information systems
enable large retailers to remove discretion from shop-floor staff in re-ordering stock.
Rather than allow local store staff or managers to decide what should be reordered,
central decision-makers simply dispatch what they are convinced will sell best. Data
generated by computerized cash registers, manipulated by software algorithms, make
it possible to dispense with thinking at the shop-floor level.
An interesting feature of these large-scale ventures is that they seem to afford
enhanced uses of information by those at the top – while wringing independent
thought and discretion from the work of those at lower levels. One can imagine
business school graduates poring over the flow of statistics on Big Macs, pants-andtops combinations or lattes grandes, in efforts to fine-tune prices, supplies, and
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staffing levels. These high-level specialists in management of “organized complexity”
(to use Bell’s term) are certainly engaged in “information occupations” – as are, for
that matter, low level staff who feed data into the system that makes the grand
assessments possible. But the underlying process at work in these settings might best
be described as a dumbing-down of lower-level work in order to intensify
management control over the organization. Whether the result is a more “knowledgeable” society, in Lane’s terms, is doubtful.
Much this same conclusion emerges from Simon Head’s recent study of the
mobilization of information technologies to rationalize work in a variety of settings.
Head focuses particularly on “call centers” created for the mass production of
telephone interactions between highly regimented staffs and customers or large
organizations. Extended analysis of phone traffic has led management to develop
software that minutely guides the responses of workers to every query, wringing
virtually all discretion and personality out of the work. Head comments,
... software companies… have created an elaborate superstructure of technology
designed to “manage” these sales encounters from beginning to end, with the
‘verbal interaction’ between agent and client playing out according to
prearranged formulas. The agent loses the power to manage the call and has
instead to defer to instructions provided by the… software, which embodies the
detailed preferences of management. A primitive version of this managed call
will be familiar to anyone who has been disturbed by the intrusion of a
telemarketer trying to sell real estate or Caribbean vacations. But the software
systems on order… vastly strengthen the managed call as a weapon of knowledge management and control.54
Here, too, one can readily recognize the analytical sophistication of the system
design, and indeed its theoretical bases in management studies and the sociology of
work. But the net effect on the intellectual content of the interactions for the parties
is surely negative.
Head casts a skeptical eye on the prophecies of rising worker autonomy and job
enrichment in an “information-intensive” environment. Instead, he observes,
At the upper echelons… new and advanced skills may be required of those who
oversee the implementation of reengineering and ERP [enterprise resource
planning] projects. But the sponsors of these systems habitually use them to
simplify the work of middle- and lower-level workers, surrounding their tasks
with elaborate regimes of business rules, and setting up all-seeing systems of
digital monitoring to make sure that the rules are being obeyed…. With the
reengineering of health care and the coming of ERP, skilled workers such as
physicians and managers are themselves no longer beyond the reach of this allseeing industrialism.55
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Rationality in public affairs
Perhaps the most inspirational element of Saint Simon’s original vision was the
prospect that knowledgeable administration of human affairs would supplant
politics. Exponents of IS views to this day widely hold that social processes
occurring in information-rich environments will be less conflictive, that more and
better information will make it easier for parties to agree on collective directions of
social action.
But the notion that more knowledge in general will somehow lead to more
cooperative action toward broadly-shared social ends raises the theoretical red flags
noted above. The unstated – and highly controversial – assumption is that human
conflict stems ultimately from inadequate information about how people might
realize values or interests that all, ultimately, share. An alternative view would
portray differences of interest within the polity as authentic and enduring. Insofar
as real social systems are better described by this second model, more information
will be apt to furnish more weapons for conflict, rather than more resources for
resolving it.
Again, one hardly expects either of these highly abstract competing models to be
upheld or rejected categorically in light of any empirical considerations. But it is
surely worthwhile to weigh the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the two models
in relation to recent social trends. Is there, in fact, any evidence that the over-all
extent or intensity of grave social conflict has been reduced through proliferation of
information or “knowledgability” (to use Lane’s term)?
How could one get a grip on a question so far-reaching? One approach would be
to take stock of major public issues or “social problems” – conflicts over basic
directions of social action requiring some sort of collective response, locally,
nationally, or globally. Examples are familiar to everyone: environmental degradation and climate change; destructive religious and ethnic conflicts; pressures for
migration of populations from poorer to richer areas of the planet; the AIDS
epidemic; high death rates from easily preventable illnesses.
Nearly every thoughtful observer, everywhere in the world, will join in deploring
these things. In nearly all such cases, experts have all but saturated debate with
supposedly relevant information. But it would be hard to argue that such clashes
were becoming a less prominent feature of human affairs, or that they were, on
balance, being resolved more easily through authoritative information. Even as
consensus grows on the reality of global climate change, for example, clashing
interests continue to block unified action – both globally and at lower levels of
organization. Widespread understanding of the biological and social origins and
transmission of AIDS does not seem to be generating consensus as to which
countries and institutions should accept key responsibilities for acting against the
epidemic. Leaders of terrorist movements and their antagonists do not seem divided
so much on matters of fact as on ultimate value or interest. One could extend this list
at length.
Has the proliferation of information on subjects like these at least reduced the
range of reasonable disagreement on directions for action? In many cases, certainly.
But one can also point to many grave conflicts in which information has become a
weapon, with all sides putting forth their own “expert” views. All in all, it would be
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rash to argue that spreading consensus is systematically reducing the intensity of, or
danger posed by, conflicts like those cited above.

Conclusion
The enthusiastic embrace of classic IS models among late-twentieth-century social
scientists has crested. But we believe that these interrelated ideas have not made their
last appearance on the historical stage. We suspect that they will re-surface, slightly
refurbished, at the service of future movements of intellectuals seeking a flagship
ideology to herald the beneficent social role of their work.
For those whose work involves creating, manipulating, and transmitting ideas –
particularly abstract and theoretical ideas – the appeal of this doctrine is bound to be
considerable. It portrays analytical thinking – or at least, the right kind of analytical
thinking – as the royal road to realization of key social values.
None of us, we suspect, is totally immune to the attractions of these ideas. Those
who find the life of the mind a challenging and rewarding adventure in itself
probably find it hard to doubt that these pursuits also bring some indispensable good
results. One notes this same carry-over in countless other domains of human
experience. Those who love to exercise, drink alcohol, or attend religious services
usually find it hard to resist the conclusion that doing such things also provides
instrumental benefits – making those who engage in them healthier, better natured,
or more successful in one way or another. Those who deplore abortion as a moral
evil in itself are also attracted to the proposition that it causes disease, mental stress,
or disability later in life. Those who love art believe that the enjoyment of it makes
art-lovers better persons.
Thus it is that those whose work involves social analysis are also inclined to
believe that such understanding promotes all sorts of other good effects. Educated
understanding of social life supposedly encourages economic growth and prosperity;
it renders the individuals who incorporate it more productive and successful; it
makes organizations more egalitarian and effective; and it reduces the role of
destructive conflict in human affairs.
We have sought to show that strong empirical backing for such expectations is
difficult to adduce – at least from data derived from the late twentieth century in the
United States, one supposed forefront of the information society. It is particularly
remarkable that so much of the available evidence is susceptible to multiple
interpretations. A key example here is the fact that better educated workers typically
make more money: does the explanation lie in their increased productivity, or in
superior status-claims associated with formal education? Or, consider the fact that
policy-making is increasingly buttressed by studies, reports and analyses. Does this
demonstrate that social practice is being constrained by the demands of reason – or
does it simply show that the trappings of reason have become weapons in enduring
clashes of interest? We stress that neither our own evidence nor any other has been
conclusive in these connections. But we find it noteworthy that what we see as the
classic core of IS ideas has exerted the influence that it has, given the unevenness of
empirical support for them.
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We conclude that honesty requires skepticism on the Enlightenment notion that
deeper, more “scientific” understanding generally conduces to the improvement of
social conditions. But without this assurance, we intellectuals face some gnawing
grounds for concern. If alleviation of ignorance and the perfection of understanding
cannot be assumed reliably to ameliorate social troubles, what claims do we wish to
make for our work?
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